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This paper examines the impact of partisan control of the media on news content and viewership by
consumers with differing ideologies. We use data from Italy, where the main private television network
is owned by Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of the center-right coalition, and the public television corporation
is largely controlled by the ruling coalition. Our first finding is that when, following the 2001 national
elections, the control of the government switched from the center-left to the center-right, news content
on public television shifted to the right. Second, we find evidence that viewers responded to these
changes by modifying their choice of news programs. Right-leaning viewers increased their propensity
to watch public channels which, even after the change, remained to the left of private channels. Furthermore,
some left-wing viewers reacted by switching from the main public channel to another public channel
that was controlled by the left during both periods. In line with these shifts in viewership, we also
find evidence of an increase in trust in public television among right-wing viewers and a corresponding
decrease among left-wing ones. Finally, we show that this behavioral response, which tended to shift
ideological exposure to the left, significantly, though only partially, offset the movement of public
news content to the right.
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Since the introduction of newspapers, there has been substantial concern over partisan control of
the media. Some observers worry that impressionable voters may be inﬂuenced by an ideological
media and that this may result in an electoral advantage for the favored party. According to this
view, an overtly partisan media may lead to the election of low quality candidates and to the
enactment of poor policies.
This argument rests upon two key assumptions. First, it assumes that ideological control of
the media will lead to biased news content. The opposing view is that, under private ownership
of the media, market forces, and viewers’ ideology in particular, are sufﬁciently strong such
that the proﬁt motive will dominate any inﬂuence motive. If the media is publicly owned, by
contrast, then the proﬁt motive may be less of a driving force. The second key assumption is
that consumers will not respond to ideological control of the media by shifting to outlets more in
line with their own ideology, a behavioral response that will only be possible with a sufﬁciently
pluralistic media sector.
In this paper, we investigate these issues in the context of the television industry in Italy,
where a single politician with easily identiﬁed ideology, Silvio Berlusconi, owns the main private
television network, and where the public television corporation is traditionally controlled by the
ruling political coalition. In particular, we examine news content and viewership of the six top
national television channels before and after the 2001 elections, which shifted control of the
government, and hence of the public television corporation from the center-left coalition to the
Berlusconi-led center-right coalition.
Our empirical analysis addresses three related questions. First, does partisan control of the
media affect news content? To address this question, we ﬁrst develop an absolute, but time
invariant, measure of station ideology. We ﬁnd that Berlusconi’s private network provided more
speaking time to the right during the period in which the right was in power than to the left during
the period in which the left was in power. Based upon this ﬁnding of an asymmetry, we conclude
that Berlusconi’s private network is biased towards the right. We then develop a relative, but time
varying, measure of station ideology. Based upon this measure, we ﬁnd that the public network
shifted to the right, relative to the private network, following the change in control of the public
network from the left to the right.
Our second question concerns behavioral responses by viewers to changes in media control.
Given our ﬁnding that the public network shifted to the right on the ideological spectrum follow-
ing the change in its control from the left to the right party, did viewers respond to the change in
content by switching to a channel with an ideological leaning closer to their own? To answer this
question, we develop an econometric model of viewer’s choice of media outlets. In the model,
viewers have incomplete information and thus potentially beneﬁt from media reports. This ben-
eﬁt, however, is larger when the ideology of the station is closer to that of the voter. We then
estimate this model using panel data on viewership and ideology before and after the shift in con-
trol. Our primary ﬁnding is that, after the change in control of the public network from the left
to the right, right-leaning viewers become much more likely to watch news on public television
channels. We also ﬁnd that some left-wing viewers reacted to this change in control by switching
from the main public channel to another public channel that was controlled by the left even after
2the change in government. Supporting this evidence of a behavioral response, we show that, after
the shift in control, trust in news on public televisions increased among right-leaning viewers,
relative to left-leaning viewers. By contrast, the relationship between ideology and trust in the
news on private channels is fairly stable during the same period.
Our third and ﬁnal question builds upon the ﬁrst two. Given that: 1) the ideological content
of public channels moved to the right but remained to the left of the private channels, and 2)
that viewers responded to this change by switching to more like-minded channels, what is the
net change in the ideological exposure of viewers with differing political ideologies? We ﬁnd
that, while those viewers who continued to watch public channels were eventually exposed to
a more right-leaning news coverage, this effect is offset in part by an opposite effect on those
viewers who switched channels and ended up being exposed to a more left-leaning coverage. In
fact, for one group of viewers we ﬁnd that, on average, overall ideological exposure was largely
unchanged following the shift in control and content to the right. This ﬁnding suggests that,
under certain conditions, for a station attempting to manipulate public opinion, increasing the
ideological content of news may be not have the intended effect.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Our paper is related to a literature on the relationship between ideological control of the media
and media content. In terms of private media ownership, Besley and Prat (2006) theoretically
examine the case for government capture of the media sector in the context of a political agency
model. They ﬁnd that capture is less likely when voters have access to a wide variety of outlets
and when ownership is independent in the sense that it is costly for the government to provide
transfers to the media. They also ﬁnd that media capture affects political outcomes. Snyder and
Stromberg (2008) empirically examine this relationship between media coverage and political
accountability based upon a measure of the geographic congruence between media markets and
Congressional districts. In a theoretical contribution, Baron (2004) demonstrates that media bias
can persist even in competitive markets environments due to the incentives for career-oriented
journalists to write sensationalized stories.
Several empirical studies provide support for the notion that control of the media matters for
media content as well as other outcomes. Djankov et al. (2003) examine control of the media in
a variety of countries and ﬁnd that government control of the broadcast media is pervasive and
that this public control is associated with poor government outcomes. Gentzkow et al. (2006)
document the movement from a partisan to an informative press in the United States between
1880 and 1920. They argue that this shift is largely driven by reductions in marginal costs of
production and the associated increases in readership along with heightened competition in the
marketplace. In a case study of coverage of Gary Hart’s 1988 Presidential campaign by the news-
paper chain Glasser et al. (1989) demonstrate that private group ownership of newspapers led to
more uniform coverage across newspapers in this instance. Pritchard (2002) examines the role of
private group ownership of newspapers in the United States on coverage of the 2000 Presidential
campaign. Finally, Puglisi and Snyder (2008) ﬁnd that bias in news coverage of political scandals
is related to a newspapers’ ideological leaning as measured by editorial endorsements.1
1There is also a larger literature on media bias and its effects on voters. See Groseclose and Milyo (2005), Della
3An alternative view is that reader preferences are the dominant factor in driving news cover-
age. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006a) formalize this argu-
ment and demonstrate that viewers choose media outlets with content conforming to their own
ideology. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006b) empirically examine this issue in the U.S. newspaper
industry and show that newspaper content is closely related to the prevailing ideology of readers
in the marketplace. They argue that reader ideology, rather than private owner ideology, is the
key driver of newspaper slant.
III. ON ITALY
Over the course of the last decade the Italian political system has been characterized by the
presence of a fairly large number of political parties aggregated into two main political coalitions:
thecenter-leftandthecenter-right.2 Despiteconsiderablewithin-coalitionideologicaldifferences
and attrition, these alliances have not experienced major transformations over the period under
examination (2001-2007). It seems therefore appropriate for the period under examination to
treat these coalitions as the key players in the Italian political arena.
The Italian broadcast television industry is composed of two main national networks - one
public and one private - and a smaller national network along with a multitude of regional and
local channels.3 The Italian public service broadcaster (RAI), is controlled by the Ministry of
Economy and Finance and operates three national terrestrial channels: RAI 1, RAI 2 and RAI
3 (labeled respectively P1, P2, and P3 henceforth, where P refers to public). RAI’s main com-
petitor is Mediaset, the main Italian commercial television network, founded and controlled by
Silvio Berlusconi through his family’s holding Fininvest, which also broadcast three national
channels: Canale 5, Italia 1, and Rete 4 (respectively B1, B2 and B3 henceforth, where B refers
to Berlusconi). Taken together RAI and Mediaset account for approximately 85-90% of the aver-
age TV viewership, and for a similar share of the market total advertising revenue.4 This de facto
duopoly, which has remained substantially unchanged over the last twenty years, is due to the
lack of a compelling regulation limiting market concentration in the television industry.5;6 The
issue of concentration in the television market is potentially even more problematic for political
pluralism given that television represents the main source of political information for the vast
Vigna and Kaplan (2007), George and Waldfogel (2006), and Gerber et. al. (2008).
2A comprehensive list of the main Italian political parties represented in the national Parliament between 1996
and 2007 - with relative coalition of afﬁliation - is reported in the Appendix.
3The other private national network is La7 (previously TMC), which is currently owned by Telecom Italia Media,
the media branch of Telecom Italia, the largest Italian telecommunications company. La7 is fairly small relative to
the two other networks and only represents about 3% of the market.
4The average daily audience share of RAI and Mediaset combined was 90.4% in 2001, 89.6% in 2002, 89.0% in
2003, 87.5% in 2004, 85.5% in 2005, 83.9% in 2006, and 82.7% in 2007. The data come from Auditel, the research
company responsible for television audience measurement in Italy. Founded in 1984, Auditel corresponds to the
so-called “joint industry committee” scheme. It is a private company operating through a board of directors and a
technical committee composed of representatives of the TV stations, media buyers and advertisers.
5This situation is even more conspicuous in view of the limited diffusion of satellite and cable television in Italy
(around 5% of the total audience in 2006).
6The new law of telecommunications, approved in 2004 by the center-right majority has not improved this situa-
tion. Quite on the contrary, it has further relaxed the requirements imposed by the previous legislation.
4majority of the Italian population.7
The relationship between the political system and the media industry in Italy is particularly
close and, for many reasons, unique. On the one hand, the leader of one of the two main polit-
ical coalitions is the owner of the top private media conglomerate (the so-called “Berlusconi’s
anomaly”). This issue has generated debate both about the possibility that Berlusconi’s use of
his group’s media could give him an advantage in the political arena, and about the opportunity
to introduce norms to regulate this kind of conﬂict of interest. On the other hand rests the con-
troversial question of the inﬂuence of political majorities on public television, and the potential
consequences for media freedom and political pluralism. Indeed, the Italian law includes no
mechanism to insulate public television from political pressures. Traditionally, in fact, the ex-
ecutive body of the Italian public broadcasting corporation has been representative of the ruling
political coalition.8 These two situations - Berlusconi’s control over private television and the
strong inﬂuence of the ruling coalition on public television - may each cause concern in their
own right. When both are at work at the same time, however, the potential impact on political
pluralism may be of even greater concern. Indeed, this was the case between 2001 and 2006,
when Silvio Berlusconi was also the head of the ruling coalition and hence in the position to
exert inﬂuence on public television.
Despite the undeniable inﬂuence of the majority, the opposition is generally granted control
of one of the three public channels; this has therefore traditionally assured some degree of ide-
ological heterogeneity across public channels. During the period 2001-2007, P3 news remained
within the sphere of inﬂuence of the left-wing coalition, whereas P2 news directors were closer to
the center-right parties. Over the same period however, the news director of P1 - the most viewed
and inﬂuential of the three - was replaced twice following the shifts in political majorities (Table
1).
IV. NEWS COVERAGE
In this section, we investigate differences in news content between and within RAI and Mediaset
and across time. We use data on coverage of political actors (parties, government, etc.) as well
as information on coverage of speciﬁc issues (economics, world affairs, etc).
7According to a recent survey by Diamanti et al. (2007), for example, broadcast television represents one of
the principle sources of information for 94% of the population. Other surveys present similar results (ISTAT, 2006;
CENSIS, 2006). Furthermore, for a signiﬁcant segment of the population, broadcast television represents the only
source of news.
8RAI is governed by a nine-member administrative council. Seven members are elected by a parliamentary
committee while the remaining two, including the president, are nominated by the largest shareholder - the Ministry
of Economy and Finance. The council appoints the director-general, the channels’ directors, and the directors of
each channel news service. The latter are very inﬂuential ﬁgures since they are responsible for setting the news
program editorial line and agenda, therefore inﬂuencing which issues or events are covered. These appointments
are made according to a long-standing system of political quotas (lottizzazione). In fact, most of the time those
appointed to these positions can be linked to one political coalition or even to a speciﬁc political party according to
previous political or professional experience.
5A. Measures of station ideology
Our main measures of station ideology are based upon data on news content. Monthly data on
the distribution of news airtime among political actors for national TV networks are available
from the Italian Communications Regulatory Authority (AGCOM), which is responsible for the
monitoring and safeguard of political pluralism in the Italian media.9 Data are available for the
top six national channels and cover the period between January 2001 and September 2007 (73
months), for a total of 438 observations. AGCOM reports the airtime devoted to the following
categories of actors: a) members of political parties and movements represented in the Italian
Parliament (excluding those involved in the government); b) the Prime Minister (PM); c) other
members of the government; d) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; e) the Speaker of
the Senate; f) the President of the Republic; g) the European Union. Three alternative measures
of airtime are available: 1) speaking time: airtime in which each political actor speaks directly to
the public (statements, interviews, etc.); 2) news time: airtime devoted to the coverage of issues
and/or events related to a political actor; 3) broadcasting time: the sum of speaking time and
news time. Unlike news time, which may include both positive and negative reports, speaking
time measures the opportunity for a political actor to communicate its views to the audience
without any mediation. Since more visibility is likely to favor a political ﬁgure, we restrict our
attention to speaking time. To calculate the total monthly speaking time devoted to each coalition,
we aggregate the speaking time of the afﬁliate parties. For the coalition in power, we also include
the time assigned to the government (PM and other members) and to the Speakers of the two
Houses, since both are representative of the ruling coalition.10
We begin by developing an absolute, but time-invariant, measure of station ideology based
upon these data on speaking time. In particular, we examine how speaking time on each station is
distributed between the majority and the opposition between January 2001 and September 2007.
This measure of station ideology is based upon a test for symmetry. If a channel provides equal
coverage of the right when the right is in power and the left when the left is in power, we conclude
that this channel is unbiased. Deviations from symmetry provide evidence of bias in one direction
or another.
When plotting the share of total speaking time allocated respectively to the majority and
opposition on Berlusconi’s channels (Figure 1a), we notice that, throughout the entire period, the
right receives more extensive coverage than the left, even when the latter is in power. Thus, we
ﬁnd evidence that Berlusconi’s network is biased to the right. The same pattern does not apply
to public channels (Figure 1b) which, on aggregate, devote a fairly stable fraction of time to the
majority, regardless of who is in power. With regard to differences between Mediaset channels
(Figure 2), while news coverage on B2 and B3 is more favorable to the right throughout the entire
period, B1 covers the two coalitions in a rather more balanced way, devoting more time to the
left when this is in power. Nevertheless, on B1 also, the gap between majority and opposition
9The status and the functions of the Italian Communications Regulatory Authority (www.agcom.it) are estab-
lished by Law n. 249 of 31 July 1997.
10We do not consider the time devoted to the President of the Republic since this ﬁgure cannot be associated with
any of the coalitions. We also disregard the time devoted to the European Union, and to those parties not afﬁliated
with any of the two major coalitions.
6is much larger when Berlusconi is in power. Turning to public television (Figure 3), all three
channels devote on average a larger fraction of time to the ruling coalition. However, on P2 the
gap between majority and opposition is larger during Berlusconi’s government. The opposite is
true for P3 which provides particularly favorable coverage of the left-wing coalition when it is in
the opposition. P1 is characterized by the most regular pattern. Over the period analyzed, in fact,
time is distributed in a fairly stable fashion between majority and opposition.
To further test these patterns we regress our dependent variable - the share of total speaking
time devoted to the majority - on group dummies (Public Channels and Berlusconi’s Channels),
and on their interaction terms with a dummy for Berlusconi being in power (Berlusconi Gov).11
The coefﬁcienton this interaction term providesa summary measureof the degreeof bias towards
to the right. As shown in column 1 of Table 2, public channels taken together tend to devote
about two-thirds of the total speaking time to the majority regardless of which coalition is in
power. The coefﬁcient on the interaction term for Berlusconi’s channels, by contrast, is large,
positive and statistically signiﬁcant (+34.6%), conﬁrming a much more favorable coverage of the
majority when the right is in power. As depicted in column 2, this result is more pronounced for
B2 and B3, but the difference is also large and signiﬁcant for B1 (+14.4%). Turning to public
channels, the coefﬁcient on the interaction term for P2 is large positive and signiﬁcant (+12.7%),
conﬁrming a clear bias in favor of the right-wing coalition. In contrast, coverage on P3 is more
favorable to the left-wing majority than to the right-wing majority (-16.4%). Finally, P1 tends to
devote a fairly stable share of speaking time to the majority, with a slight difference in favor of
the right coalition (+3.8%).
This measure of station ideology is based upon the assumption that an unbiased station pro-
vides equal coverage to the majority coalition regardless of its political leanings. This allows us
to construct an absolute measure of ideology. Even without this assumption, however, one can
compare coverage across stations in order to measure the relative positions of the stations on the
ideological spectrum. According to this comparison, which is based upon the coefﬁcients on the
interactions terms in Table 2, we can order the stations from left to right as follows: P3, P1, P2,
B1, B2, and B3. Thus, the public stations all lie to the left of the private stations, and the public
station controlled by the left throughout the sample (P3) is at the extreme left.
One limitation of these two measures of station ideology is that they do not account for
changes over time in the party controlling the main public channel (P1), which will be the key
source of variation in the behavioral responses section to follow. To examine the role of changes
in control, we next develop a time-varying, but relative, measure of station ideology. This mea-
sure gauges the change in content on the public network following changes in ideological control,
relative to the change in content on the private network, which was controlled by Berlusconi for
the entire sample.
In order to implement this relative measure, we use the fraction of speaking time devoted to
the right party rather than the fraction of speaking time devoted to the majority. We again regress
speaking time on group dummies (Public Channels and Berlusconi’s Channels), and on their
11Some members of the majority coalition may be particularly exposed to the media during certain periods of
the year (e.g. the Ministry of Economy during the discussion of the budget law). To control for possible seasonal
variations in the coverage of the majority, regressions in Table 2 and 3 include calendar month ﬁxed effects.
7interaction terms with a dummy for Berlusconi being in power (Berlusconi Gov). The coefﬁcient
on this interaction term provides a measure of how each channel shifted their coverage of the
right after Berlusconi’s party is in control. We also include an overall constant and an indicator
for Berlusconi being in power since we would expect all channels to devote more coverage to
the right when the Berlusconi is in power. Thus, we must omit the key coefﬁcients for one
channel, and all results should be interpreted as relative to this omitted category. Thus, this
measure captures changes in the relative positions of stations on the ideological spectrum but
cannot measure whether a particular station or the sector as a whole is biased to the left or to the
right.
Asshownincolumn3, weﬁndthattheprivatenetworkdevotedlesscoveragetotheright(-3.5
percent), relative to the public network, during the period in which Berlusconi was in government
and hence controlled the public network. Thus, relative to the private network, the public network
shifted to the right after control of the network switched from the left to the right. Importantly,
however, the shift is not large enough to offset the positive coefﬁcient on Berlosconi’s channels
(+19%), and the public network, when controlled by the right, thus remained to the left of the
private network. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that the public network shifted towards,
but stayed to the left of, the private network during periods in which the public network was
controlled by the center-right party.
We next examine heterogeneity in coverage within the public and private networks. As shown
in column 4 of Table 2, where channel P1 is the omitted category, we ﬁnd that, relative to each
of the ﬁve other channels, the main public network (P1) moved to the right during the periods
in which the center-right was in control. These results are statistically signiﬁcant for channel P1
relative to channels B1, B3, P2, and P3. In terms of comparing the two largest channels, B1
and P1, we can say that P1 remained to the left of B1 in all periods but that these ideological
differences between the two were smaller when the right was in power. In terms of comparing
P3 and P1, we conclude that P1 was to the right of P3 in all periods and that these ideological
differences between the two were larger when the right was in power. Taken together, we thus
conclude that P1 was a less extreme version of P3 when the left was in power and a less extreme
version of B1 when the right was in power.
B. Additional Evidence on Speaking Time
Returning to our measure based upon speaking time devoted to the majority, another question
of interest is how this time is distributed among different members of the ruling coalition (i.e.
prime minister, other members of the government, majority parties’ congressmen, Speakers of
the House and the Senate), and whether the distribution changes depending on who is in power.
One way to address this issue is by looking at the time assigned to different members of the ruling
coalition as a fraction of the total time devoted to the majority (Table 3). We estimate separate
regressions for: i) the government; ii) the Prime Minister; iii) other members of the cabinet; iv)
congressmen afﬁliated with majority parties; v) Speakers. The results show that when Berlusconi
is in power his channels tend to cover the government disproportionately more. Interestingly, this
result is mostly driven by a steady increase in the coverage of the Prime Minister himself (+10.7%
on B1, +16.9% on B2, and +40% on B3). On the contrary, the shares of time assigned to members
8of the majority in Parliament and to the Speakers tend to remain stable or to decrease. We do not
observe the same pattern for public channels. Although P1 and P2 provide a larger coverage of
the government, in none of the public channels do we observe an increased coverage of the Prime
Minister.
C. Coverage of News Categories
In this section we test whether there are systematic differences in news category coverage across
Italian television channels. Each channel’s choice of categories may depend on the characteristics
of its viewers. For example, individuals with more liberal views tend to attach more importance
to topics such as world affairs, labor and social issues; conservative viewers tend to be more
concerned with issues related to law and order, immigration, and security. Daily data on news
coverage by issue for national TV networks are available from the Osservatorio dei Media di
Pavia, which monitors and analyzes the content of day and prime time news programs.12 For
each piece of news, the following information is reported: order of appearance, content summary,
duration, and macro issue.13 Data are only available from January 2003 through March 2006, a
period which falls entirely under the right-wing government. Hence, we can only provide a
description of the differences across channels in this speciﬁc political environment.
Our dependent variable is the share of total weekly coverage devoted to different news cat-
egories. We primarily focus on three macro categories characterized by fairly clear ideological
connotations: i) World News, ii) Labor & Social Issues, iii) Crime & Security.14;15 We begin by
examining the differences in the share of weekly news reports in each category between Rai and
Mediaset.16 As shown in Table 4, the results suggest that, overall, public channels tend to provide
signiﬁcantly broader coverage of World News, and Labor & Social Issues.17 On the contrary, the
coefﬁcient on RAI is negative and highly signiﬁcant for Crime & Security. Berlusconi’s channels
also devote a smaller fraction of time to Politics.
We then compare coverage across individual channels (Table 5). We use B1 as the base
outcome of our regressions in order to facilitate the comparison of public channels with the most
12Founded in 1994, the Osservatorio is an independent non-proﬁt organization specialized in monitoring and
analyzing mass media political communication. The Osservatorio has long cooperated with the Italian national
broadcasting corporation for which it has carried out media monitoring since 1994.
13News reports are grouped in macro categories: arts, culture and entertainment; business and ﬁnance; chronicles;
crime news; criminality (organized crime); defense and security; education; farming, ﬁshing and food production;
food and drink; gossip; health; justice; labor issues; media and telecommunications; nature and environment; poli-
tics; science and technology; religion; social issues; fashion and style; sports; transportation; world news. Residual
categories include: unclassiﬁed (advertisement, titles), other, public service information (weather forecast, trafﬁc
conditions, etc.).
14The macro category Labor & Social Issues results from the combination of two of the categories originally used
for news coding: Labor Issues; and Social Issues.
15The macro category Crime & Security results from the combination of three of the categories originally used
for news coding: Criminality (Organized Crime); Chronicle; and Crime News.
16Two measures of coverage are available: the number of news reports in each category, and the total time devoted
to them. Since the two measures are highly correlated (0.97), and the results obtained using one or the other are very
similar, we only report the results based on the number of news reports.
17Note that these regressions also include calendar week ﬁxed effects.
9viewed of Berlusconi’s channels. Interestingly, all three public channels devote proportionally
more airtime to Word News, Labor & Social Issues, and Politics than does B1, and proportionally
less to Crime & Security. P3, in particular, displays the largest coefﬁcient in all regressions,
followed by P1 and P2. These ﬁndings are broadly consistent with the political coverage results
discussed above. When turning to the private channels, we observe mixed results. Relative to B1,
coverageonB2tendstofavorCrime&SecurityattheexpenseofWorldNewsandLabor&Social
Issues, and Politics. Coverage on B3, by contrast, resembles public channels, especially with
regard to coverage of Politics, Labor & Social Issues, and Crime & Security. This is surprising
given our conclusion following the speaking time analysis that B3 was biased to the right.
D. Summary
We have found that the Italian television market for news appears to be segmented along differ-
ent lines. On the one hand lies the crucial distinction between private (Berlusconi’s) and public
channels. Overall, Berlusconi’s channels provide a more favorable coverage of the right-wing
coalition relative to public channels. In particular, they tend to devote a much larger share of
time to the majority than to the opposition when Berlusconi is in power. Furthermore, during
this period, the distribution of time within the majority is much more skewed in favor of the
executive and, especially, of the Prime Minister himself. On the other hand, we also ﬁnd evi-
dence of substantial heterogeneity within Berlusconi’s channels with B2 and B3 offering a more
unbalanced coverage than B1. Public channels display an even larger degree of heterogeneity
based on political afﬁliation with P2 leaning towards the right, and P3 toward the left. Unlike the
other public channels, P1 is not characterized by a particular left-right bias. Rather, it generally
favors the ruling coalition over the opposition, regardless of the color of the majority. As a con-
sequence, the placement of P1 in the political spectrum - and consequently its relative distance
from other channels - is not ﬁrm but changes depending on which coalition is in power. We also
observe similar patterns in terms of issue coverage. In particular, we ﬁnd that public channels
devote a larger share of coverage to political events, foreign affairs, labor and social issues, and
signiﬁcantly less to crime and security.
V. BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES
In this section, we examine how viewers altered their viewing habits in response to the changes
in media ownership and content documented above. We begin by deriving a theoretical model
of consumer choice of media outlets. The model is based upon a media sector that provides
potentially valuable information to imperfectly informed consumers. We then use the theoretical
model to generate an empirical speciﬁcation of the choice of media outlet by viewers of differing
ideologies.
A. Theoretical Setup
Society must choose between two policy alternatives (p 2 fL;Rg). These options could be inter-
preted in a variety of ways, including an election featuring two parties, a decision over whether
to go to war, or proposed changes to immigration policy. There is a set of individual voters,
10indexed by v, and a set of news stations, indexed by s. Voter’s payoffs from each policy option
depend upon two factors. First, each voter’s judgment of the policy options is affected by a cer-
tain ideological position. Thus, left-leaning voters are predisposed to the left-wing option and
likewise for right-wing voters. In addition to this ideological dimension, we assume that there is
a payoff that is common to all voters. We refer to this payoff as the quality of the policy option,
and the options thus can be interpreted as ‘good policy’ or ‘bad policy’. In the electoral context,
this quality dimension can be interpreted as the experience or integrity of the candidates. In the
conﬂict context, the common payoff would depend upon the degree of the threat posed by the
hostile nation.
More formally, we assume that voter v receives the following payoff from policy options p:
Uvp = qp t(iv ip)2 (1)
where qp represents the quality of p, iv represents voter ideology, ip represents the policy’s po-
sition in the ideological spectrum, and t represents the relative importance of the ideological
dimension. We assume that iL < iR so that increases in ideology are associated with movements
to the right. Deﬁning relative utility as Dv =UvL UvR, we have that:
Dv = q+a  biv (2)
where q = qL qR represents relative quality; a = t(i2
R i2
L) is a constant, and b = 2t(iR iL)
represents the coefﬁcient on voter ideology.
We assume that voters know the ideological positions of the policy options (iL;iR) but are
uncertain over quality. Priors over relative quality (q = qL  qR) are unbiased and normally
distributed with variance s2
q: Voters potentially observe a news report (ns) from station s. Before
observing any news, voter v supports L if his ideology is below a threshold:




After observing a report, voter v supports L if his ideology is below a quality-adjusted threshold:




Thus, if voters update favorably with respect to L upon observing report ns, then E(qjns) > 0;
and the threshold thus shifts to the right. This convinces some voters who supported R ex-ante to
now support L. Similarly, if voters update favorably with respect to R, then E(qjns) < 0; and the
threshold thus shifts to the left. In order to understand how voters update their beliefs following
news reports, we next present a framework for news station coverage choices.
Similarly to voters, stations can be characterized by their ideology (is): News stations are
assumed to have better information than voters about the quality of the policy options and may
provide valuable guidance. In particular, we assume that station s receives an unbiased signal
11over the relative quality of the two options:
qs = q+es (5)
where es is the noise in the signal and is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
variance s2
e: Given this information, stations update over quality as follows:
E(qjqs) = wqs (6)




Following the literature, we assume that news reports are ‘coarse’ in the sense that news
organizations cannot feasibly provide all of their information gathered during their investigations
in a single news report.18 As a simpliﬁcation of this idea that news reports are coarse, we assume
that news stations provide binary reports, which are favorable to one of the two policy options.
That is, voters observe a news report from station n favoring either the left policy option (ns = L)
or favoring the right option (ns = R):
Given these assumptions, station s thus provides a report supportive of L if the signal exceeds
a station-speciﬁc threshold:




where the threshold is increasing in the ideology of the owner. If the signal does not exceed this
threshold, the station provides a report supportive of R.
B. Value of an Informative Media
Readers attempt to learn about quality from these news reports but this inference is potentially
complicated by the ideological position of stations. The value of information from station s thus
depends upon the preferences of the voter. For a left-leaning voter [a  biv > 0]; the value of
information (W) is the possibility of a report favoring R:
W = Pr(R)E( Djns = R) (8)
















The ﬁrst term is negative and represents the cost of voting against one’s prior. The second term
is positive and represents the value of information. This second term is maximized at is = a=b;
which can be interpreted as the ideology of an unbiased station, and is thus declining in the degree
of bias. For a right-leaning voter [a  biv < 0]; the value of information is the possibility of a
18See, for example, Suen (2004) and Baron (2006).
12report favoring L:

















Combining these two measures into a single expression for the value of news to consumers, we
have that:















The ﬁrst and second terms combined are negative for both left-leaning and right-leaning voters
andagainrepresentthecostassociatedwithvotingagainstone’sprior. Theﬁnalterm, bycontrast,
is positive and represents the value of information to the voter. We next use this derived value of
an informative media in order to understand the choice of news stations by viewers of differing
ideologies.
C. Analysis of Choice of Outlet
As a benchmark, consider the case in which voters with differing ideologies can directly choose
the ideology of the station (i
s). Using the fact that f0(z)= z f (z), we can show that the relevant













Thus, readers prefer a station with ideology equal to their own (i
s = iv): This result is similar to
Suen (2004), who examined a similar model but with binary signals and binary payoffs.
As a ﬁrst step towards generating an empirical speciﬁcation of the choice of media outlets,
suppose next that voters cannot choose station ideology directly. Instead, each chooses to watch
one station from a limited menu of S+1 outlets, which are indexed by s=f0;1;2;:::;Sg: In order
to make this choice probabilistic, we next assume that, in addition to the deterministic payoff in
equation 11, voter v receives an idiosyncratic payoff from station s equal to evs: We can then write
the payoff to voter v from watching station s as follows:
Wvs = qv+qs+lsiv+evs (13)


















the station-speciﬁc coefﬁcient on voter ideology (ls) is related to the ideological leanings of the
network. Assuming that evs is distributed type-I extreme value and normalizing the payoff from
13station 0 to equal zero, viewership probabilities are given by:








Thus, a multinomial logit model of the choice of station by viewers of differing ideology allows
for identiﬁcation of the channel-speciﬁc parameters (ls), which, as shown above, are closely
related to the ideology of the station owner.
D. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we estimate a model of the individual choice of channel before and after the 2001
change in government. This model suggests that viewers may switch to like-minded outlets fol-
lowing a change in control of the government from center-left to center-right. Given the ﬁndings
of the content analysis, we hypothesize that left-leaning voters may switch from channel P1 to
channel P3. Correspondingly, we hypothesize that right-leaning voters may switch from channel
B1 to channel P1.
To test these hypotheses, we use survey data on political attitudes and electoral behavior from
the Italian National Election Study series (ITANES), which includes a set of novel questions on
individual media and news consumption.19 For the purposes of our analysis, the ﬁrst wave was
conducted in the weeks following the May 2001 national elections and involved 3209 individuals.
1882 of these (58.6% of the original sample) were re-interviewed in the second wave, which as
conducted between April and June of 2004. A complete description of the questions used is
provided in the Appendix.
Before turning to the econometric results, we ﬁrst present trends in viewership between 2001
and 2004 for viewers of differing ideologies. As shown in Figure 4, there was no reduction
among left-leaning viewers, deﬁned as those with self-reported political ideology equal to 1 or 2
on a 5-point scale in 2001, in the propensity to view news on channel B1, which remained low
in both periods. There is a noticeable increase, however, in viewership of channel P3, which
was controlled by the center-left coalition both before and after the elections. This increase was
associated primarily with a reduction in viewership of channel P1. Among centrists, deﬁned
as those with political ideology equal to 3 on a 5-point scale, there was a small increase in
viewership of channel P3 news. The more prevalent factor, however, is a signiﬁcant shift in
viewership away from channel B1, the most popular channel of the private network, to channel
P1, the most popular channel of the public network. As shown in the bottom panel, the shift
from channel B1 to channel P1 is even stronger among right-wing voters, deﬁned as those with
a self-reported political ideology equal to 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale. Taken together, these results
19The Italian National Election Study (ITANES) is a long-term research project on electoral behavior established
in the early nineties by the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo Research Foundation (www.cattaneo.org). Several pre- and post-
electoral survey studies have been conducted in the context of the ITANES project over the course of the last fourteen
years (1994, 1996, 2001, and 2006). In many aspects the questions included in the ITANES surveys are analogous
to those used in the surveys of the American National Election Study (ANES).
14suggest that right-leaning viewers responded to the shift in control and content of channel P1 to
the right by increasing their consumption of this channel and that left-leaning viewers responded
by increasing their propensity to consume news from the left-leaning channel P3. We investigate
these patterns more completely next in an econometric model of viewer choice of news channel.
Our econometric analysis begins with a simple analysis of the choice between public and
private channels in which public is the omitted category. As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 6,
as voter ideology moves to the right, viewers are more likely to watch private channels, relative
to public channels, in 2001. More interestingly, however, is the coefﬁcient on the interaction
between voter ideology and the time period in which Berlusconi controls public television. As
shown, right-wing viewers, relative to left-wing viewers, are more likely to watch public chan-
nels, relative to private channels, after Berlusconi is in control. This is consistent with the content
analysis above, which documented increased coverage of politicians from the center-right coali-
tion on public channels after Berlusconi is in control and provides evidence that viewers do have
preferences to watch news content with ideology similar to their own.
Wenextextendtheanalysistoinvestigatepotentialheterogeneitywithinthepublicandprivate
networks. In particular, the ﬁnal ﬁve columns of Table 6 presents results from a multinomial logit
choicemodelinwhichchannelP1, whichhasthelargestviewershipofthepublicchannelsinboth
periods and whose control shifted from the center-left to the center-right, is the omitted category.
Thus, these results can be interpreted as relative to P1. As shown, right-wing voters were much
more likely to watch any of the private channels relative to channel P1, prior to Berlusconi taking
control of the public channels. Within the public channels, left-wing voters were more likely to
watch P3 than P1 even prior to Berlusconi taking control. Most interestingly, however, is the
interaction between viewer ideology and Berlusconi controlling the public channels. As shown,
the ideological gap between B1 and P1 shrinks, but remains positive, after Berlusconi takes
control of P1. The ideological gap between P1 and P3, however, increases as P1 becomes less of
a substitute for P3 among left-leaning viewers. Taken together, these results are consistent with
the content analysis, which demonstrated that channel P1 was a less-extreme version of P3 when
under center-left control but was a less-extreme version of B1 when under center-right control.
E. Offset measures
Taken together, the above results provide signiﬁcant evidence that viewers responded to the
changes in content by shifting to channels with ideological content similar to their own ideology.
Importantly, however, both the content analysis and this revealed preference analysis suggest that
the ideology of channel P1, the public channel controlled by the center-right in 2004, remained to
the left of the private channels even after the change in control. These results, combined with the
shifting of right-wing viewers to channel P1 and the shifting of left-wing viewers to P3, suggests
that the ideological exposure of some viewers actually moved to the left following the shift in
public control and content to the right. This behavioral response and the associated unantici-
pated effect of exposure moving to the left may substantially offset the direct effect of moving
ideological content to the right following the change in partisan control of the public media.






Pr(v chooses s)Pr(s reports R) (15)
Thus, holding viewership probabilities ﬁxed, increases in right-leaning content are associated
with increases in expected ideological consumption. Also, we deﬁne the percent offset measure,
which is fraction of the change in ideological consumption associated with a partisan shift in







v;2004 ) uses 2004 station ideology but 2001 choice probabilities. To interpret this
percent offset measure, consider two extreme cases. First, if there is no behavioral response, then,
E(Cno switch
v;2004 ) = E(Cv;2001) and percent offset will equal 0. On the other hand, if the behavioral
response is complete in the sense that ideological exposure does not change, then E(Cv;2004) =
E(Cv;2001) and percent offset will thus equal 1.
In terms of measuring E(Cv), we use 2001 and 2004 predicted probabilities from the multi-
nomial logit in order to estimate viewership probabilities for each channel. Also, using the fact





= ls=b, we can estimate reporting probabilities up to a scale
by the channel-speciﬁc coefﬁcients from the multinomial logit.20
Figure 5 provides the results from this analysis separately by viewer ideology. As shown, the
offset is sizable for left-wing viewers, reﬂecting the shift from P1 to P3 for many of these viewers.
While signiﬁcant, the offset is incomplete since many left-wing viewers watched P1 in both 2001
and 2004, following its shift to the right. The percent offset, by contrast, is small for center-left
voters. This reﬂects the fact that fewer of these viewers shifted from P1 to P3. Comparing center-
left to center, however, the percent offset increases, reﬂecting the fact that more of these viewers
were watching B1 prior to 2004 and switched to P1 in 2004. For center-right and right-wing
voters, the effects associated with the shift from B1 to P1 are very signiﬁcant. For the extreme
right, this shift almost completely offset the change in content on channel P1. In addition to the
shifting from B1 to P1, this large offset also reﬂects the fact that relatively few of these viewers
were watching P1 in 2001 and thus the direct effect of moving content to the right was relatively
small.
F. Trust analysis
To provide further support for our assumption that viewer choice of like-minded news stations is
based upon receiving better information, we next analyze questions in the survey regarding media
credibility and trust in the media. In particular, we investigate the relationship between political
ideology in 2001 and trust in public and private television in both 2001 and 2004. As shown in
the top panel of Figure 6, trust in public television is higher in 2001 than in 2004 among left-
of-center voters, those whose self-reported ideology in 2001 was 1 or 2 on a 5-point scale. For
20This scaling parameter disappears when computing our percentage offset measures given by Ov:
16centrist viewers, trust is public television is similar in 2001 and 2004. For right-of-center voters,
by contrast, trust in public television is higher in 2004 than in 2001. These patterns are consistent
with the content analysis, which documented a shift to the right in public news content in 2004,
and with the choice analysis, which documented an increase in public viewership among right-
leaning viewers in 2004. As shown in the bottom panel, overall trust in Berlusconi’s channels fell
between 2001 and 2004. The relationship between ideology and trust in Berlusconi’s channels,
however, was relatively stable in 2001 and 2004, with trust increasing as ideology moves to the
right. If anything, the documented decline in trust was strongest among right-leaning voters.
To test for the statistical signiﬁcance of these results, Table 7 provides results from a regres-
sion of trust on political ideology in which the coefﬁcient is allowed to vary between 2001 and
2004. As shown in the ﬁrst column, trust in the public channels is decreasing in ideology in
2001 but this effect disappears in 2004, a period in which there was little or no relationship be-
tween trust in the media and political ideology. As shown in the second column, the interaction
between political ideology and trust in the private channels is positive in both 2001 and 2004. Fi-
nally, the third column demonstrates that trust in public, relative to private, increased signiﬁcantly
for right-leaning viewers, relative to left-leaning viewers. Taken together, these results provide
additional support for our informational interpretation of the changes in viewership following
shifts in partisan control of media content.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates partisan control of the media in the context of Berlusconi’s Italy. We ﬁnd
that a shift in control of the public media from the center-left coalition to the center-right coalition
led to a shift in ideological content, as expressed in speaking time devoted to politicians from
different parties, from the left to the right. We also ﬁnd that viewers responded to these changes
in a variety of ways. First, many viewers changed their choice of news program in response.
Right-wing viewers switched to public television, which moved to the right despite remaining to
the left of private television in terms of ideological content. Some left-wing viewers, by contrast,
abandoned the majority-controlled channel P1 and switched to the left-leaning channel P3. The
degree of this shifting was sufﬁciently strong that the ideological consumption of news among
somegroupsofviewerswaslittlechangedfollowingthechangeincontrolofchannelP1. Second,
left-leaning viewers reduced their trust in public television, while right-leaning increased their
trust. Taken together, these results demonstrate that partisan control of the media does lead to
biased coverage but that viewers are sufﬁciently sophisticated that they respond to these changes
in a variety of ways, thereby offsetting, at least in part, the direct effect of the manipulation of the





Major Italian Political Parties (2001-2007) 
 
Party 
   Coalition 
  
Forza Italia  Center-Right 
Alleanza Nazionale  Center-Right 
Unione di Centro
1  Center-Right 
Lega Nord  Center-Right 
Movimento per l’Autonomia  Center-Right 
Nuova Democrazia Cristiana  Center-Right 
Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano  Center-Right 
Partito Repubblicano Italiano  Center-Right 
Democratici di Sinistra
2  Center-Left 
La Margherita
3,4  Center-Left 
Rifondazione Comunista  Center-Left 
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani  Center-Left 
Verdi  Center-Left 
Italia dei Valori
5  Center-Left 
La Rosa nel Pugno  Center-Left 
Sinistra Democratica  Center-Left 
Socialisti Democratici Italiani
6  Center-Left 
UDEUR  Center-Left 
Socialisti Craxi  Center-Left 
Südtiroler Volkspartei  Center-Left 
Alternativa Sociale  Independent 
Azione Sociale  Independent 
MSI Fiamma Tricolore  Independent 
Democrazia Europea  Independent
7 
I Radicali
8  Independent 
Partito dei Pensionati  Variable
9 
 
                                                 
 
1 Previosly Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD), Cristiano Democratici Uniti (CDU). 
2 From October 2007 merged into Partito Democratico 
 
3 Previously Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI), “I Democratici”, and Rinnovamento Italiano. 
4 From October 2007 merged into Partito Democratico. 
 
5 Previously “Lista Occhetto-Di Pietro”. 
 
6 From November 2006 merged into the “Rosa nel Pugno”. 
 
7 Not affiliated with any major political coalition until December 2006 when it merged into the UDC. 
8 From November 2006 merged into the “Rosa nel Pugno”. 
9 Part of the Center-Left coalition from February 2006 to November 2007 when it joined the Center-Right coalition. 
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Question: In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. In this card there is a 
row of cells going from the left to the right. Thinking about your political opinions, where 
would you place yourself?  
 
Left                Right 
A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  L 
 





TV News Consumption 
 
Q.: Do you usually watch news programs? If so, how often?  
 
No, never  
Less than once a week 
1 day a week 
2 days a week 
3 days a week 
4 days a week 
5 days a week 





Favorite TV News Program  
 





Tg4 (Rete 4) 
Tg5 (Canale 5) 
Studio Aperto (Italia 1) 
TMC News 
Local news program 




Q.: Please tell me how much you trust each of the following institutions (i.e. very much, 
some what, little, not at all) 
 
    Very 






1  Parliament  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
2  Political Parties  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
3  President of the Republic  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
4  Catholic Church  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
5  Armed Forces  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
6  Judiciary  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
7  Press  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
8  RAI-TV  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
9  Mediaset TV Stations 
(Canale5, Rete4, Italia1)  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
10  Trade Unions  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
11  Police and Carabinieri  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
12  Public Administration  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
13  Confindustria        
(Business’ union)  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
14  European Union  1  2  3  4  9  -1 
 
 
Perception of partisan bias 
 
Q.: Have you had the impression that the news program you watch the most is in favor of 
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28June 2000 G. Lerner (Center-Left)
October 2000 A. Longhi (Center-Left)
2001 Elections
April 2002 C.Mimum (Center-Right)*
2006 Elections
September 2006 G. Riotta (Center)
1994-2002 C.Mimum (Center-Right)*
April 2002 M. Mazza (Center-Right)
1998-2000 E. Chiodi (Center-Left)
June 2000 A. Rizzo Nervo (Center-Left)
July 2001 A. Di Bella (Center-Left)
P3 (Channel 3)
* From 1991 to 1994 and after July 2007 served respectively as deputy director and
director of  Berlusconi's Channel 5 News.
P1 (Channel 1)
P2 (Channel 2)





































Observations 438 438 438 438
R-squared 0.974 0.986 0.644 0.808
Calendar month fixed effects included. Public Channels is the base outcome in Column 3; P1 (Channel 1) is the base outcome in column 4.
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
B1
Right
Table 2. Distribution of Total Speaking Time by Group and Channel
Dependent variables: Share of Total Monthly Speaking Time
Majority Majority Right
P1
Berlusconi_Gov  *  P1
P2
Berlusconi_Gov  *  P2
P3
Constant
Berlusconi_Gov  *  P3
B3
Berlusconi_Gov  *  B3
Public Channels
Berlusconi_Gov  *  P. Channels
Berlusconi's Channels
Berlusconi_Gov  *  B.'s Channels
Berlusconi_Gov  *  B1
B2
Berlusconi_Gov  *  B2
Berlusconi_Gov
300.528*** 0.117*** 0.399*** 0.439*** 0.036***
[0.058] [0.037] [0.039] [0.056] [0.010]
0.085** 0.107*** -0.010 -0.083** -0.008
[0.036] [0.026] [0.030] [0.036] [0.007]
0.487*** 0.170*** 0.321*** 0.467*** 0.050***
[0.065] [0.055] [0.054] [0.058] [0.019]
0.109* 0.169*** -0.066 -0.067 -0.049***
[0.056] [0.054] [0.057] [0.052] [0.016]
0.180*** 0.011 0.178*** 0.816*** 0.004
[0.052] [0.032] [0.037] [0.052] [0.009]
0.493*** 0.400*** 0.079*** -0.482*** -0.014**
[0.030] [0.029] [0.027] [0.031] [0.007]
0.467*** 0.139*** 0.329*** 0.491*** 0.047***
[0.053] [0.033] [0.036] [0.053] [0.010]
0.063** -0.026 0.086*** -0.097*** 0.028***
[0.026] [0.018] [0.022] [0.027] [0.008]
0.397*** 0.130*** 0.274*** 0.570*** 0.036***
[0.054] [0.034] [0.037] [0.053] [0.009]
0.114*** -0.028 0.133*** -0.142*** 0.022***
[0.031] [0.020] [0.025] [0.033] [0.007]
0.448*** 0.128*** 0.332*** 0.511*** 0.046***
[0.052] [0.035] [0.035] [0.052] [0.009]
0.017 -0.023 0.025 -0.044 0.020**
[0.030] [0.020] [0.022] [0.031] [0.008]
Observations 438 414 414 438 426
R-squared 0.947 0.820 0.884 0.890 0.792
Calendar month fixed effects included. Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.











Table 3. Distribution of Majority Speaking Time among Different Members of the Ruling Coalition




310.062*** 0.015*** -0.033*** 0.028***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
0.133*** 0.034*** 0.185*** 0.049***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 340 340 340 340
Number of weeks 170 170 170 170
R-squared 0.860 0.550 0.540 0.730
Politics
Table 4. Distribution of Coverage across News Categories (by Group)
Dependent Variable: Share of Total Weekly News Reports
Constant
World News Labor & Social Issues Crime & Security
Public
Base outcome: Berlusconi's Channels. Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
-0.047*** -0.010*** 0.065*** -0.021***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
-0.001 0.006*** -0.031*** 0.021***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002]
0.039*** 0.006*** -0.012*** 0.028***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002]
0.033*** 0.006*** -0.012*** 0.019***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
0.071*** 0.029*** -0.046*** 0.037***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
0.150*** 0.035*** 0.175*** 0.049***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Observations 983 983 983 983
Number of weeks 170 170 170 170
R-squared 0.700 0.420 0.610 0.580
World News Labor & Social Issues Crime & Security
Table 5. Distribution of Coverage across News Categories (by Channel)
P1
P2




Base outcome: B1 (Channel 5). Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
B3
Constant
32Private Channels B1 P3 P2 B2 B3
0.708*** 0.641*** -0.347*** -0.100 0.529** 0.537***
[0.059] [0.064] [0.105] [0.098] [0.207] [0.184]
-0.173*** -0.223*** -0.223* -0.060 -0.135 -0.070
[0.061] [0.071] [0.123] [0.116] [0.231] [0.201]
Observations 2756 2756 2756 2756 2756 2756
Log Likelihood -1603 -3288 -3288 -3288 -3288 -3288
Pseudo-R square 0.147 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.134
Political Ideology
2004*Political Id.
Column 1 base outcome: Public channels. Other coulmns base outcome: P1 (Channel 1).
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 6. Favorite News Channel by Political Ideology (2001 vs. 2004)
Dependent variable: Favorite News Channel
The following controls and their respective interaction with the 2004 dummy are included: gender, education, age, occupational status, social class, church attendance, index of 





Observations 2721 2701 2701
R-squared 0.069 0.183 0.177
Trust Public Trust Berlusconi Trust Public - Trust Berlusconi
The following controls and their respective interaction with the 2004 dummy are included in the regressions : gender, education, age, occupational 
status, social class, church attendance, index of political knowledge, TV exposure, regional fixed effects.                                                               
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% .
Table 7. Trust in Public and Berlusconi's TV (2001 vs. 2004)
Dependent variable: Self-Reported Level of Trust (1-4)
Political Self-ID
2004*Political Self-ID
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